The Man–Machine Interface In The Security Environment

Professor Kris Pillay
Head – Department of Security Risk Management
School of Criminal Justice
University of South Africa

INTRODUCTION

Many technological aids have become available to assist us in the fight against crime. Since we live in a hi-tech world, criminals have many technological resources available to them, such as computers, covert cameras, cellphones, radio jammers and interceptors. Therefore we, too, should use technology to deter, monitor and apprehend the modern criminal. Whether we use man or machine to perform the security function, each has its strengths and its weaknesses.

THE MAN–MACHINE INTERFACE

Technology should never be used as a substitute for good operational controls and procedures. Rather, electronic security measures should be used to complement procedures. If everyone adheres to established, easy-to-follow procedures, security becomes more effective.

The man–machine interface determines the function, percentage and integration of humans and technology in the security environment. Some of the issues to be evaluated are whether to use manned security only, technology only, or a combination of both. Let's consider each.

Should we use manned security only?

The use of manned security only will depend on the size of the area, the number of entry and exit points, the spread of assets within the area, and the reaction time of response vehicles.

For example, in an industrial complex a single security officer can protect only a limited area based on his or her ability to see the protected area in question. If the area being protected is not visible at all times, then there is no protection. An officer performing patrols will always leave certain areas vulnerable at any one time. We can increase the number of officers and the frequency of patrols, but, depending on the size of the area, this may be impractical and very expensive. It is therefore important to decide whether the application warrants the use of manned security, security aids or a combination of both, as well as what percentages of manned security and security aids are to be used.

Should we use technology only?

When protecting a small area, a domestic dwelling or a retail store, it is normally sufficient to make use of technology on its own, provided that suitable monitoring and reaction are utilised.

Remember at all times that a security system is only as good as the manned response. An intruder alarm cannot catch criminals, and a CCTV camera is of no value unless someone is watching the monitor and reacts to what it shows.

Should we use a combination of manned security and technology?

In almost all cases, good security applications will require a combination of manned security and technology. Although technology will do most of the detection, surveillance and warning signals very well, it is of no use unless action is taken. To use technology as a deterrent only is risky and could be considered false security. Technology may deter some criminals but not all — it is not a guarantee. Therefore it is important that technological action be followed by human reaction.

The following table highlights situations where human intervention is or is not required to complement security technology:

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGY

Security technology has become a necessary and useful aid to complement human efforts in combating crime. Manufacturers continuously strive to improve existing products and design new ones to deter or detect criminals. Computer technology has come a long way in speeding up detection and reaction times, giving the criminal less and less time to penetrate a well protected area. However, despite technology's strengths there are also certain weaknesses, as indicated in the following table:

We'll look briefly at problems and disadvantages of CCTV systems in particular and also at problems with intruder alarm systems.

Problems and disadvantages of CCTV applications

CCTV applications may have the following known problems:

• Distortion — when the picture on the screen becomes blurred or unclear
• Down time — when the camera does not work due to a technical failure
• Obstruction — area to be covered is obstructed by stored goods, trees or parked vehicles (which were not there initially)
• Too many cameras under the control of one CCTV operator
• Fatigue on the part of the CCTV operator
• Poor operation due to lack of training on the part of the CCTV operator
• Ventilation — lack of proper ventilation in the control room, or a control room that is too hot or too cold
• Space — lack of space for writing and recording of incidents
• Storage — lack of proper and secure storage facilities for recorded videos and DVD discs
• Streaking — caused when the bright lights of cars shine directly into the lens of a camera and cause the image to have streaks

CCTV systems may have the following disadvantages:

• A CCTV system is only as good as the security officers who control the system. A security officer who is incompetent or asleep reduces the effect of a CCTV system.
• Top management may approve the purchase of a CCTV system but neglect the training and retraining of CCTV operators.
• Current CCTV system technology may be outdated within a few years.
• CCTV systems are relatively expensive.
• CCTV can be affected by fog, heavy rains and dust (outdoor cameras).
• CCTV may provide a false sense of security.
• The existence of a CCTV system may cause other security measures to be neglected.

3.2 Known problems with intruder alarm systems

Intruder alarm systems may experience the following problems:

• Poor installations causing false alarms
• Incorrect component selection causing false alarms or non-activations
• Environmental disturbances such as extreme heat, insects, wind, drafts, birds and rodents causing false alarms
• User error causing nuisance alarms, and failure to arm the system correctly
• A lack of confidence in the system created by too many false alarms

4. TECHNOLOGICAL AIDS USING ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

As we have stated, technology must be seen as an aid to other security methods. One such method is the use of the environment to aid our security application. By looking at the bigger picture, we can enhance security with the use of environmental design. Our ability to secure and protect thus goes far beyond the mere protection of a single building or asset.

The goal of environmental design is the reduction of opportunities for crime to occur. This reduction is achieved by employing physical design features that discourage crime, while at the same time encouraging the use of the environment. Many of the individual environmental design elements should be familiar to the security professional. Hardware, lighting and surveillance are all standard tools of the trade. However, the emphasis is not just on the components; it is how the components are used that makes the difference. The security programme is integrated into the environment, not just added on.

Environmental design also offers protection without resorting to the prison camp approach to security. This approach is also cost-effective, since hardware applications are made during construction rather than added at a later date.

To understand fully how environmental design is used to enhance security, we must examine its components and the philosophy behind them. Although crime prevention through design is itself relatively new, its individual elements are common security techniques. We'll consider the elements of layering, surveillance, landscaping and physical security.

Layering

To achieve maximum control, an environment is first divided into smaller, clearly defined areas or layers. All areas are designated as either public, semi-private or private. This defines how each area is used and determines who has a right to occupy it:

• Public areas: These areas are generally open to anyone and are the least secure of the three areas. This is particularly true when the area is located within a building or in an area with uncontrolled access and little or no opportunity for surveillance.
• Semi-private areas: These areas create a buffer between public and private areas and serve as common-use spaces, such as interior courtyards. They are accessible to the public but are set off from the public area. This separation is accomplished with design features that establish definite transitional boundaries between the areas.
• Private areas: These are areas of restricted entry. Access is controlled and limited to specific individuals or groups. A private residence is a good example of a private area.

Division between areas is generally accomplished with types of barrier. These can be either physical, electronic or symbolic:

Physical barriers: As the name implies, physical barriers are substantial in nature and physically prevent movement. Examples include fencing, electric fencing, some forms of landscaping, and locked doors.
Electronic barriers: These may be detection or surveillance components such as CCTV, active infrared beams, and alarms.
Symbolic barriers: These are less tangible. Nearly anything could serve as a symbolic barrier. The only requirement is that it define the boundary between area. This type of barrier does not prevent physical movement. All that is required is that it leave no doubt that movement between areas has taken place. Low fences, flower beds, paving and signs are examples of symbolic barriers.

Surveillance

Surveillance is the main weapon in protecting a restricted area. Criminals are least likely to act when there is a high risk of being seen. In environments where occupants have a high degree of visual control, criminals are more likely to be observed and reported.

We can distinguish between natural and formal surveillance.

Natural surveillance

Natural surveillance occurs as a direct result of architectural design. Designs that reduce visual obstacles and eliminate places of concealment for potential intruders offer the best protection against crime. Such architectural design may include avoiding large amounts of shrubbery close to a building, thus preventing potential intruders from concealing themselves there without being detected. A good practice is to keep an area of at least 10 to 15 metres free of obstacles or shrubbery surrounding a building, allowing security personnel a clear field of view.

For occupants, an intruder’s visible entrance into a restricted area draws attention and arouses possible alarm. For intruders, entering a restricted area or open space highlights their actions and greatly increases their risk of being noticed.

Formal surveillance

Formal surveillance methods, such as closed-circuit television, electronic monitoring, guard posts and patrols, are normally used only when natural surveillance alone cannot sufficiently protect an area.

Landscaping

Landscaping design, like architectural design, plays a significant role in crime prevention. Landscaping can be used to perform a variety of design functions.

As a symbolic barrier, landscaping can mark the change between areas. Features such as fencing, flower beds, ground cover and paving can clearly show separation between zones. If more substantial barriers are needed, shrubbery such as low hedges can be used to create more obstacles.

From a surveillance standpoint, landscaping can be critical. Such factors as growth of plants and their placement are extremely important. Visual corridors must be maintained in open, park-like areas as well as in densely planted areas. As a rule, visual surveillance corridors can be maintained by limiting shrubbery to a maximum height of one metre, and trees to a minimum height of two metres at the lowest branches. This approach ensures that visibility will always be unimpaired.

Physical security

People who design the physical security systems of building projects need to understand crime and criminals and how they work. Unfortunately this is seldom the case, resulting in soaring residential and commercial burglary rates. Crime problems could be significantly reduced by properly applying security components and eliminating security weaknesses.

As an element of environmental design, physical security planning is not intended to create an impenetrable fortress. The goal is merely to make penetration more difficult and time-consuming. The degree of difficulty and length of delay are key factors in reducing the probability that crime will occur.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most important rule in security planning is to keep security convenient. The more that security blends with normal day-to-day operations, the less likely it is that employees will be able to circumvent the controls. In an industrial or commercial environment, the weakest link is people. Without the co-operation and commitment of the users, security measures can be a futile exercise and a wasted expense.

People will seek the path of least resistance. Employees will always attempt to find the easiest way to perform their duties. If this causes a breach in security, it is only a problem if they get caught. If a route through an emergency exit is the quickest way to the parking lot, there is always the temptation to take the shortcut.

With this in mind, technology that requires little or no human intervention or control is the preferred security approach. When this is not possible, procedures should be such that the system blends in with the normal operation and is relatively simple to use.

Go Top