Synergy Between Public And Private Sector Security Systems
(Presented at IISSM-2006)

- Mr. Vepa Kamesam, Managing Director, Institute of Insurance and Risk Management,
Hyderabad and formerly Deputy Governor of Reserve Bank of India

Over the last decade, globally, several Governments have increasingly adopted the PPP model wherein investments from the private sector and public has accounted for a significant share and the Governments funding in projects, etc. has progressively declined. As a working model, particularly, in the area of creating infrastructure, this has attained measurable success in Power, Highways, Water Projects, Urban Transport, Airports, Seaports, Aviation, etc. Privatization of many of the Public Sector Undertakings has become a reality and the government disinvesting its stake to the investing public and also opening of avenues for Foreign Director Investment (FDI) and FII’s up to the specified sectoral limits. All these transactions are done in a transparent manner for the larger good of the Companies who are really starved of the capital needed for expanding their activities and in turn providing better services to the public.

The theme of this discussion extends to synergy between public and private sector in Security Systems. In a way, it is closely aligned to the general philosophy applicable to the PPP model in the economy. I would confine myself to the areas concerning physical security within India to our national assets. I am fully alive and aware of a totally different model adopted in US and some other countries where more than 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure is in the control of the private sector and it is private sector civilians who have to respond to protect their national assets in crisis situations. It would be inequitable to draw any comparisons between the US model and the Indian model. My comments are made with particular reference to the banking system, with which experience I am somewhat familiar. There are other sensitized systems exclusively maintained and controlled by the Government and its designated agencies for the protection of nuclear plants, defence installations (including manufacture of aircraft and warships and military hardware), satellite launching systems and several other public buildings, valuable national assets, power systems, dams, bridges, border control at international boundaries, airports and seaports, etc. Each one of them eminently qualifies to have highly sophisticated systems for their protection at all times on a 365 days x 24/7 basis. The entire defence forces, the police, the national security and intelligence apparatus and other agencies do have a clear oversight in this area, particularly, with increasing terrorist attacks on civilian targets.

Any protective security system must address these concerns irrespective of the agency delivering the needed security. The persons working within the organizations which need this protection must be sensitized and every individual in the organization must be aware and conscious of the need for security. Periodic meetings with the key personnel and heads of departments are held and most organizations carry the post of a Chief Security Officer, who invariably is a retired defence personnel or a high ranking official from the Police Department. These men have the necessary vision and the practical experience to look at all the vulnerabilities to which a particular organization can be exposed to. Therefore, first comes the putting up of an effective system against Perimeter intrusion. Large project areas, factories, etc occupy several hundreds of acres of land, which are guarded by boundary walls and also by physical personnel carrying suitable weapons for protection purposes and in sensitive installations it is not uncommon to have observation towers at regular intervals and night vision glasses are also provided apart from powerful binoculars for observation purposes. The staff are provided with walkie talkie sets also. Most such installations observe the very valid and time tested principle of single ingress and egress to a site. Only authorized vehicles and personnel are given access. Further, thanks to the revolution which has taken place in Information Technology and photography, particularly, digital photography and videography, it is possible to see from a remote point in a control room, the images coming from different locations where the surveillance cameras are installed, concealed from the public gaze. After the entry staff are satisfied with a authorized vehicle and with it the persons who are authorized to enter the premises through the single air-locked system, the vehicles are physically inspected with undercarriage mirrors and even the engine area and the luggage boot are also checked and the persons are bodily frisked and scanned with handheld devices who are also made to pass through Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMD). X-ray baggage scanners have now become a routine in large installations for scanning the handbags etc. The Chief Security Officer and his men and the management of any company or organization and its staff must develop that sharp eye and remain perpetually alert as the exit point for any mischief-maker is often narrow and passage through that narrow point can always be kept under tight observation and surveillance. Also the facial expressions, body language and behaviour, often reveal invariably, the ultimate intentions. Technology by itself is not adequate. What is needed is the men who operate the Technology and interpret the vast amount of information coming to them in the form of intelligence reports, images or any other input. In some locations, only selected personnel are allowed access to a limited area who are provided with biometric access cards. It is not uncommon to store the fingerprint images of the staff working in an organization who are given access cards for this purpose. All the others need to be escorted to a particular visitor’s room where meetings and discussions are held. Seldom, a visitor is given access to the actual shop floor area alone by himself. The biometric technology, the proximity cards, the digital technology using PTZ cameras have all become a part of today’s survival for existence. All the staff are sensitized by mock-drills at irregular intervals to keep them in a state of alertness and any suspicious objects are isolated and destroyed by a device using IED technology. In some locations, before the boom barrier gates, there are mechanically operated sharp ‘Tyre Bursters’, should the vehicles not stop and attempt to barge inside. Bollards are also used in some areas and the men on duty are generally persons who are trained to spot the unusual mischief-maker by studying the facial expressions, and such persons are given greater attention.

Within an organization after a person enters with a proper ID card which also acts as a proximity card, the access is confined only to the areas to which he is permitted to enter. In other words, with one proximity card it is not possible to enter into another location in the same organization. In this country ‘iris’ recognition is considered to be fool-proof just as the fingerprints are also considered fool proof. Inside large factories, infra-red detecting equipments and alarm systems are also to be in place, so that the alarms get triggered whenever there is a breach and immediately alerts the police control room to which these are linked.

All these security devices underscore the need for state of art technology in protecting national assets which cannot be the responsibility of only the State and therefore, the Public Private Partnership becomes more important. While still the Government spends very large sums of money on defence expenses which are part of the overall national security plan, the demand for installing such systems for civilians in the areas has become very wide. Thus, every Company whether in the private sector or public sector has become extremely aware of the need for the sophisticated equipment, particularly, when cash and bullion and other valuables are moved from one centre to another. To the robbers there could be nothing more attractive than looting a cash van or breaking into a bank and walking away with the cash. The concerned frontline bank staff are provided with emergency panic buttons linked to the alarm systems in the event of a holdup during business hours. A large number of companies in the private sector in collaborative joint ventures with foreign companies specialized in manufacturing these equipments, have opened businesses in this country and are meeting the security needs, while the police system provide the general security for the national assets and its citizens.

In this note, I have not touched upon Computer related security systems and any disaster management processes. Practically, any worthwhile organization is now fully computerized and therefore, IT security protection the LAN and WAN systems, Firewalls, PK1, encryption etc. are all relevant and need to be acquired and put in place to prevent stealing the data or indulging in cyber crimes. Lastly, there is nothing like absolute security as each day new strategies are being hatched by the law breakers, calling for determined solutions to deal effectively every situation that arises. The companies operating in the economy need to protect themselves with all these surveillance systems and there is no substitute than sensitizing the man power to the security requirements which are relevant to a particular organization. Each nation evolves its own solutions in this area, so that they are able to nip the crime at its origin even before it takes off.

Go Top

Security for Urban Transportation
(Presented at IISSM-2006)

- Mr. Kerran Campbell, Global Technical Director Security,
Sinclair Knight Merz, Australia.

Introduction

In no other area of security is there more of a need for synergy between the Public and Private sectors than in the area of Urban Transportation.

Urban transportation sees the largest regular congregation of the public in our cities on a daily basis. It doesn’t matter whether it is trains (over or underground) buses, taxis, three wheelers, private cars or the multitude of trucks, as well as the infrastructure that supports these commuter vehicles; these lines of commutation are the lifeblood of our urban communities. Without the infrastructure and rolling stock of our urban transportation system the wheels of commerce would quickly grind to a halt. This means that Urban Transportation is an absolutely vital cog in the social and economic success of any major capital city.

It is because of this that Urban Transportation has been the target for some successful and many unsuccessful terrorist attacks in the last decade. Because of the necessity for the public to use this transportation on a daily basis, there is little other threat in the world today that strikes more anxiety into the heart of the travelling Public other than the threat to Aviation.

It is ultimately the responsibility of the Public Sector to ensure that the Urban Transportation systems delivering this service can keep functioning regardless of any issues that arise, however Urban Transportation systems, including the majority of the security afforded them, are more often than not delivered by the Private Sector. Therefore to achieve a common goal, i.e. smooth functioning of the life blood of our capital cities; it is vital that these two sectors operate in synergy. Urban Transportation in a global sense, covers a significant number of different forms of transportation, these include, but are not limited to:

• Road infrastructure, including bus stations, bridges and tunnels (land and water), interchanges and control centres for

  • Passenger cars and Motorcycles
  • Light trucks
  • Heavy Trucks
  • Intercity Bus
  • Transit Bus

• Rail infrastructure including stations, track networks, power systems and signalling centres for

  • Heavy rail
  • Light rail
  • Commuter rail

Because of the events in Tokyo (1995), and more recently in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai (2006), we tend to focus on the issues of Commuter Rail and Transit Buses, yet all of those listed above are potential targets, and could be the subject of even greater casualties, and cause significantly more disruption to any urban transport system if a successful attack was to occur. This paper will however only concentrate on both Commuter Rail and Transit Buses. The method of considering the synergy required between the Public and Private sectors will be via how each contributes to the application of the security treatment plans.

Many of the philosophies and, in a philosophical sense, methodologies that apply to the treatment the plans for trains and buses are readily transferable to the other elements of urban transportation, although the detail will of course differ.

All treatment plans whether they are organisational and/or operational must address both physical and/or technology attributes as well as security management, as these are part of the integrated security solution.

In terms of general security that applies to urban transportation, as with most forms of security, once the umbrella of risk management expands to cover issues of much greater threat (a terrorist crime), the issues of minor general crime fall under the overall shadow cast by the larger umbrella. In other words if you cater for the major crimes, the security infrastructure in place usually will provide the level of risk management required to cater for the minor crimes and general security scenarios. Often there is minor tweaking of the procedures required to cater for the specific threats, but these are usually of a minor consequence.

The creation of security infrastructure as described in this paper will usually cater for most of the general security issues that affect Urban Transportation.

Treatment Plans
In security – “If you fail to plan – you are planning to fail”.

In the context of security and safety of urban transportation, the aspect of planning takes on even greater importance. The ability for the responsible organisations directly securing urban transport operations, i.e. the organisations security department even with the most sophisticated tools, being able to prevent an attack of the like experienced in Tokyo, London, Madrid and Mumbai are extremely small; in risk management terms too small even to countenance. This of course does not, nor should it; preclude all measures being taken to achieve the goal of prevention. If the prevention of an incident was to be achieved even with the tools available to the operating organisation, it would be most likely out of luck rather than by design.

Intelligence is the only real tool one has to prevent attacks of this nature; hence for the issue of prevention, the planning should optimise the use of intelligence, and consider how this element of the security tool box can be maximised.

An example of some of the treatment plans we will consider include:

• Managing the security for urban transport.
• Tapping into the intelligence available
• Maximising the deterrence of an attack
• Create an atmosphere of confidence in the public
• Incident management to deal with an attack
• Recovery planning to restore service as soon as possible.

Each of these treatment plans will address elements from an organisational as well as operational perspective. These individual plans will be interdependent on one another as part of an integrated security solution.

In every case the plans must be formalised and documented and made available to all those who will use them. Not all personnel will need to have access to the entire plans, or even all of a particular plan that applies to themselves, however all will need to be fully acquainted with the element that affects them, and the procedures for which they are responsible.

How these treatment plans are compiled and distributed can depend on the facility/organisation in question, however the basic format should not significantly change.

A brief description of some generic considerations of these treatment plans follows.

Management

The plans involving security management are the most important element of any risk management strategy. The plans must define who is responsible for the management of security, and how that management is implemented. The treatment plan must include, but will not be limited to:

• An organisational Policy that clearly defines the global outcomes required and the charter of the urban transport organisation, and the role it fulfils managing the security of the facility/organisation. The policy must however integrate into both the Federal and where applicable State strategies that apply, as well as the current Federal and State legislation, and countenance the embrace of as many stakeholders as is possible. The policy must be meaningful, achievable and acceptable in the context of the security environment created by the current threat level.

• An organisation plan that ensures the facility/organisation is headed by a security professional, appropriately experienced, who is empowered to implement the risk management strategy defined for the facility, or facilities/organisation in question. This manager must have a direct line of communication to the CEO, and be able to interact and report to the CEO as required by the gravity of the incident or situation in question. The manager must also be empowered to direct and control all of the security personnel employed for the protection of the facility/organisation, and as well be able to influence and where necessary direct other personnel for the needs of security. Whilst probity and OH&S safeguards will always need to be in place, the need for autonomy in most circumstances is vital. The manager will also be responsible for implementing the organisational treatment plan, and for its constant up date.

• A plan that defines the growth and capital expenditure for the organisation on a structured time frame. Typically this could be a five year period, however can vary depending on the parent organisation. The budgets should consider all facets that impact on security from the:

  • Physical and engineering attributes of the buildings and infrastructure applicable to security as well as the security components for the rolling stock

  • The security technologies being employed with due consideration for replacement periods, as well as emerging technologies pertinent to this field

  • Staffing costs

  • Training costs

  • Travel for manager and senior staff for updating and contemporary authority interaction.

  As with any management of security, the opening of the purse strings for capital expenditure is usually triggered by an “incident” and managers should be well prepared to take advantage of the opportunities when they arise.

• A hierarchy of security that defines for each member of staff, who operate in the facility whether permanent, part time or contract, a structure for each position, or personnel relative to security:

  • What are the functions and responsibilities this person must perform
  • To whom do they report in matter of security
  • What is the level of competency/training required for them to fulfil that role
  The hierarchy must consider all personnel that will be involved in the operation.
  
  Security is NOT just the responsibility of the guard force, it is everyone’s responsibility and the more pairs of eyes and ears that can be harnessed the more likely intelligence that can contribute to prevention and mitigation of an incident can be achieved. The hierarchy as an element of the total treatment plans is fluid, and requires adjustment as the organisation changes and alters.

• A comprehensive training program that is preferably delivered in house, tailored to meet the particular treatment plans being implemented. The training is not only to cater for security staff, but for all staff who participate in the urban transport process. The training program should engender cross pollination of ideas and information between not only the guards and staff of the individual elements of the system in question, but also between other state and city authorities. The old adage that there is no mortgage on security wisdom particularly applies in this field. The ability to have trainers and supervisors exchange like roles in different authorities for predetermined periods significantly assists organisations with the introduction of fresh ideas.

• A well trained and structured guard force that has the powers of arrest and similar operational responsibilities as law enforcement, indeed that are a special arm of law enforcement (although separate from the state police) with skills and training tailored specifically to urban transportation. The guard force should include both uniformed and plain clothes officers, the numbers of which being dependent on the particular security issues at hand. The training program should explicitly define the boundaries of the legislation under which the organisation operates and what behaviour will be acceptable under all operational conditions. This includes the use of weapons, force and restraint.

• The definition of all of the operational procedures that enable the policy agreed for the organisation to be implemented. The procedures must be produced for each category of hierarchy defined in the hierarchy of security. The procedures should be of such a form they can be disseminated to all staff in both full form as well as an abridged memory jogger version.

• The methodology of interaction with patrons of the service to ensure the public maintain the confidence in the service delivery of the system, and that they (the public) will be as safe as achievable when using the service. This should also include the method of interaction with the authorities, including:
  – The broadcasts of regular bulletins to the public
  – The advertising of public awareness campaigns – “watch, consider and report”
  – The day to day communication with patrons.

The building of public confidence in the system as noted further in this document is the use of public engagement. This is discussed in the terms of staff awareness; however there is much benefit of the use of public as an extension of the security service. The majority of the public will, if engaged in the correct manner, contribute to the safety and security of the urban transport system by reporting incidents; however they have to know how this can be achieved by themselves, and possibly by examples of what they should be looking for. Also the easier it can be undertaken the more likely the public support will occur.

The treatment plans for the security management underpin the safe and secure functioning of the urban transport systems.

Intelligence

One of the more important treatment plans is for the managing and dissemination of intelligence.
Intelligence, its generation is usually the province of the Public sector. It is generated in a manner and from sources that the Private sector cannot achieve. This is not to say that the Private sector cannot contribute to the supply of intelligence by harnessing the multitude of sources that are employed there, however the analysis and dissemination is, by necessity, co-ordinated by the Public sector.

Intelligence is the key to deterrence and the prime weapon in the preclusion of any major attack on any facility/organisation, inclusive of those involving urban transportation. Urban transport Authorities must tap into as much as possible the intelligence available, and make use of the not only the networks of these authorities, but also other similar transport authorities in other countries, states and cities to keep urban transport authorities informed of not only the current trends and threats, but also the methodologies being utilised by those perpetrating the threats.

The fragmentation of information between differing and competing authorities has been the root cause of not detecting a number of major incidents that have occurred across the globe in the last decade. In many cases retrospective analysis has indicated a clear audit trail of information which with better authority interaction and ultimately intelligence analysis may have been able to prevent the incident occurring. 20/20 hindsight is always illuminating, however the need for transfer of information and interagency co-operation between the authorities in macro and micro terms once a threat has been identified cannot be over emphasised. This is where the synergy between the Public and Private sectors is VITAL.

The regular interaction between groups that gather and utilise intelligence with live updating of incidents and potential incidents by informal as well as formal communications at all levels significantly supports the intent of the treatment plans. Just how the interaction occurs is ultimately the responsibility of the intelligence authorities and the security manager although there are statutory responsibilities of many of the prime government authorities to initiate the transfer of information to achieve the most effective outcomes.

One of the more important outcomes of inter agency co-operation is the development and agreement of standard alert level responses. These can be transmitted to agencies on a pre-programmed basis to allow upgrading of response and implementation of agreed management criteria to meet the alert level advisory at the facility base level while more detailed information is transmitted and disseminated. The use of alert level responses can increase effectiveness of managing security outcomes on a 24 hr basis with minimal management action.

In addition to receiving information, the urban transport security departments, and personnel are also a significant source of gaining intelligence. With even minimal training, the considerable numbers of personnel who operate on urban transport systems have enormous potential to gather information which could assist in the preclusion or at least mitigation of attacks. Almost every recorded incident that has occurred on Urban Transportation, both successful and unsuccessful, was trialled sometimes not just once. In other words someone went to see what was achievable and then in most cases rehearsed it. By utilising the capacity of those numerous eyes and ears, with a sound methodology of information collation and verification using where possible CCTV, suspicious personnel or acts can be identified and the information passed on to higher authorities for consideration.

The intelligence flow must however have established paths, whereby the information is delivered in a meaningful manner in both directions. There is little use of gaining intelligence if it is not utilised. Intelligence ascending the upward path may be discarded as they are considered inconsequential; however it may be a prime element of a much larger jigsaw. Intelligence descending must also be utilised in the most effective manner. The security management must be able to impart this information in a manner which gets it to those who will make best use of it as expeditiously and accurately as possible. Regular bulletins of information to those who need to know, and will be able to make the most effective use of the information in both written and verbal form keep those involved in the delivery of security informed and involved.

The treatment plan for use of intelligence is vital, and the co-operative interaction of Public and Private sectors essential.

Deterrence

The plan for the deterrence of issues that affect patron safety, crime or a major attack involve not only the management element of security noted above but the prime tools of physical attributes and the supporting technology. The treatment plans need to consider these individually and in-concert as part of the global security solution.

1 Physical Attributes
The treatment plans for the physical attributes require consideration of the particular facility/organisation in question. Just as to whether the facilities are;

• Existing, and if so whether they are old, or even very old;
• New;
• Being or yet to be constructed;

Can impact on the ability to meet current security requirements.

Regardless of the age or condition, the ability of the facility to be configured to support a contemporary security solution to treat the risks that apply will require a thorough security assessment. The assessment (sometimes termed survey or audit) will examine the characteristics of the facility in planning, physical and hardware terms to meet the treatment plan identified.

The methodology used in the assessment is not a subject of this Conference, however there a number of salient items that need consideration for both buildings and rolling stock, and these should be included in the treatment plans. Those that impact on the buildings include:

• Access control and management – physically controlling access in a manner ensures all those entering and leaving are channelled through areas where both human and electronic surveillance can occur.

• Management of non authorised vehicular traffic where possible, including maximising setbacks from roads or boundaries.

• The application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design – (CPTED) and analysis of the planning and fabric to support the principles of CPTED. This prime element utilises the use of natural surveillance and well designed sight lines for staff as well as patrons. It also considers the preclusion of re-entrant corners and locations where items can be left unattended (out of view) as well as the natural and artificial illumination that supports this philosophy and can significantly assist monitoring of stations and terminals by staff and closed circuit surveillance on a constant basis.

The principle extends to the type, location and artificial illumination of:

• Trees and landscaping
• Rubbish receptacles
• Seating
• Signage – both commercial and for transportation
• Public toilets
• Windows
• Colours to support CCTV surveillance.

All of the above have the ability to impact on the orderly security of a facility.

The following list is by no means exhaustive, however is indicative of items that are commonly treated on urban transport facilities.

• Blast considerations – very few (if any) of the existing facilities created for urban transport would have any resistance to blast, particularly the older ones. Whilst the ability to resist blast is not a specific criteria of an urban transport facility, a brief analysis as to what blast pressure might be sustained, and what might be an outcome for different levels of charge at likely locations will enable any future alterations to be undertaken in a manner that can mitigate the impact of a potential attack. This consideration extends from the facility in question to its immediate and extended environs.

• Illumination to support the security solution, on a 24 hr basis. This includes the illumination for the human as well as the technological element; these two are becoming more diverse as technology becomes more sophisticated. The assessment must consider the quanta, colour, location and projection of illumination relative to human sightlines as well as camera locations.

• The infrastructure and space to incorporate weapons, noxious materials and explosives detection technology. Whilst this is not considered a viable option at this point in time, emerging technologies may well provide the opportunities for these to be incorporated in the future. The prime infrastructure is planning for space allocation in the entrance access control locations.

It is recognised that it is not practicable or economically viable to achieve optimum security solutions once an assessment has determined the weaknesses, which there are invariably many. Most of the lesser costly and less disruptive items can be attained with relative ease, whilst other items can then be prioritised as part of the facilities treatment plans so that as capital expenditure is made available, or renovations and upgrades occur, these can be implemented. The critical issue is to know and understand the deficiencies so appropriate strategies can be implemented to cater for these in the long term.

In the case of rolling stock the prime considerations are the CPTED principles in the car design. The principles that:

• Maximise windows for both internal and external surveillance,
• Designs that promote clear sight lines and discourage covert criminal intent,
• Colour schemes that support human and CCTV surveillance,
• Illumination that supports human and CCTV surveillance,
• Seating that allows clear surveillance above and below,
• Cabin fabric that is robust and vandal resistant

With existing rolling stock it is extremely difficult to alter the physical characteristics. It is only at the time of the initial design or a major refurbishment that any significant upgrade is achieved.

Notwithstanding the inability to achieve the necessary physical upgrades of both buildings and rolling stock to meet current security needs, the treatment plans must recognise this and counter the deficiencies by either management or technology, until the physical upgrading can occur or other issues alter the solution.

2 Technology

Technology must be a functional element of the overall security solution.

Technology can operate on an individual or system wide basis, depending on the configuration of the treatment plans and how the plans utilise technology into an integrated solution.

The technologies that need consideration include but are not limited to:

• A security management system – This technology should consider the following features:

  • Management accountability with recording of all of the actions initiated, alarms recorded and sub systems managed by the security management system

  • Access control technology

  • Intruder detection technology

  • Duress alarm technology

  • Guard tour technology

  • Perimeter barrier management technology

  • Closed circuit television integration capability and closed circuit television system management technology

  • Building Management System interface technology

  • Lift system interface technology

  • Fire system interface technology

  • Car park management system interface technology

  • Communications system integration technology

  • Personnel photo/smart card biometric identification generation and management technology, including data base integration technology.

• A closed circuit television system incorporating digital video storage and archive management and video motion detection. The closed circuit television system must be capable of full integration with the SMS system, and the building data system.

• Communications technologies including but not limited to:

  • Trunked ultra high frequency radio communications

  • Hardwired security communications to all man machine interface locations, strategic access control locations, emergency control point locations and prime building services room locations, and strategic security point locations

  • Interface to personal digital assistants (PDA) for alarm updates to roving staff

  • Interface of the security communications into the Public Service Telephone Network

  • Emergency management interface into the building data backbone for distribution of emergency warnings:

    • Directly to local area networks
    • To each staff’s personal computers and to the general data points within the urban transport network
    • To visual display units within the lift systems
    • To information visual display units where these are deployed on platforms
    • To all station buildings and platforms and all rolling stock

The security technology should be a fully integrated solution which minimizes operator actions. The system should be pre-programmed to initiate recording and control so that the system presents information for operators as to the action to be initiated. The system must be capable of initiating pre-programmed messages to the various communication systems as required, with logging of all callactivities.

It is preferable if the security technology can have an off site link, so the integrity of the technology can be monitored remotely. This can be achieved with cross monitoring of like facilities. The off site monitoring can also be achieved with Government authorities, depending on the infrastructure available, or the strategic importance of the particular facility in question.

The technologies employed for urban transport systems should also include:

• Remote audio projection so that unmanned stations for both bus and rail can project audio to the stations remotely from a centralized location, to broadcast both general and specific warnings to patrons and offenders alike.

• Remote emergency management of rolling stock so that under certain threats the drive mechanisms or engines of the bus or train can be shut down, and vehicle can be bought to a controlled stop.

• Consideration for the inclusion of explosive detection technologies to enable expeditious verification of suspicious objects. The use of access detection systems as used in Airports are not yet acceptable for the volumes of passengers that would require treatment per unit time for urban transport systems. There are however emerging technologies that may become acceptable in the future, and the plans should promote investigation and monitoring of the progress of these systems for incorporation in access management as noted in the section of physical security.

• Serious consideration of the most effective explosive detection systems yet devised. – Dogs! This consideration is not only because at this point in time they are the most technically effective, they are currently the most cost effective in the volumes of material that can be screened per unit time.

These also have a significant deterrent effect, and can give comfort to the public.
The treatment plans need to consider how the technology can support the treatment of individual as well as global threats.

Creating Public Confidence

It is a priority for the public to have confidence in their urban transport system. If Governments are to achieve the policy decisions made that encouraged them to invest in these transportation systems, the service must have the confidence of the public.

The 2005 incidents in London initially shattered public confidence, however the methods applied in the treatment of these issues by the government and the transportation authorities quickly restored the public confidence in the system, and the utilisation swiftly returned to the pre attack levels.

The security departments of urban transportation systems are generally seen as the public face of these organisations, and are in many of these organisations the frontline of developing this confidence as they are the team interacting with the public. The security guard force performs (like the majority of private security organisations) as many public relations functions as security functions. Research has shown that friendly, courteous security guards, who are constantly interacting with the public, can have an affect on altering behaviour patterns of offenders (or potential offenders) in areas where they patrol.

The numbers of the guards employed have been determined as those being necessary to provide the level of protection required by the risk management strategy. Their numbers are there to achieve the outcome desired. The majority of the time if only employed for security alone they are waiting for something to occur so they can apply their training. Because of this they are indeed a valuable resource that can be used to assist in building this public confidence that is so vital to the success of the system.

An additional item of increasing the public confidence in the system is the use of regular staff awareness campaigns that encourage the need to engage the public. The public are not to be seen as the enemy, they are the reason transport systems exist. As part of the security hierarchy noted in section 3.0 of this document the training for each level of personnel involved in urban transport system should also involve elements of staff awareness. The awareness should involve engagement techniques such as those used in retail security, involving eye contact and conversation to also assist in public interaction which then assists building the confidence the public have in the system.

The treatment plans must consider this important role of the security guard, and provide the guard force with not only security training and information, but also training in other aspects of public information and interaction, including public relations to build this confidence.

Incident Management

The treatment plans for incident management could be the subject of a separate Conference in its own right. The methodology required is well known and understood, and knowledge on the topic is readily available. With an urban transport facility/organisation the topic is broad, and clearly the treatment plans need to be incident specific. The risk assessment will have identified the most likely threat and the consequences that might be expected. As a result, the plans can be prepared with specific scenarios in mind, and postulate the most appropriate method of treatment.

Most plans have a generic background that underpins them supplemented by issues to be addressed for the incident in question. The plan ultimately will be implemented by the Incident Controller in a manner that reflects the specific incident being addressed and the plans should include but not be limited to:

• Be able to address all kinds of emergencies that can impact on both safety and security of the facilities/organisation. Many of these may not necessarily be a security issue.

• Include input from, and document the interaction with Government and other authorities who will become involved in a major incident. These depending on the incident could or would include:
  
  – Police – State and Federal
  – Ambulance services
  – Major hospitals
  – Local Authorities
  – Specialist Government Stakeholders (for nuclear, biological and chemical issues)
  – Private security contractors
  – Private support contractors
  – Telecommunications companies

• Defining the chain of command and control, nominating positions and illustrating the interaction with each authority. There are a number of models that have been produced in the last decade, some of these were triggered by the Oklahoma bombing and the methodology of emergency management applied there. The control and management of that rescue involving some 12,500 personnel over a 15 day period provided many valuable lessons in the management and control of major incidents. Likewise similar lessons were achieved from the issues of 9/11 and the bombings on London.

• As any major emergency will impact on the security, and the incident management plan must account for this interaction to make the most effective use of the resources available. Security staff are usually the first line of defence, and there are numerous incidents that illustrate where inappropriate actions of the first line of defence can have disastrous results.

• The Incident Management Plans are invariably, but not always, produced under the guidance of an Incident Management Committee. This committee should comprise representatives of all authorities who have jurisdiction, and as well as senior operatives of the organisations security and general management and there are numerous standards detailing how this should be undertaken.

• The plan must include training scenarios, and regular simulations both desktop and live, involving the facilities/organisations who will be involved in managing the proposed incidents.

Recovery Planning

The final issue with major treatment plans for urban transport is the recovery plan. As with the incident management plans the methodology required is well known, understood, and knowledge on the topic is readily available.

The most important issue in urban transportation is that many people rely on this as their only means of transportation and it is critical to get the system operating as swiftly as possible.

One major factor that is often overlooked in recovery planning is when an incident occurs that involves a crime, such as terrorism, the area where the incident occurs is immediately declared a crime scene, and the denial of access to the scene, can be considerable. The scene cannot be contaminated until the investigation is complete and the ability to restore access and therefore services can be hampered for a considerable time.

It is wise therefore that in the preparation of recovery plans that contingencies are considered that will allow the area to remain sterile and in the hands of investigations for an extended period. As such multiple alternatives to achieve a suitable outcome must be considered.

The treatment plan for a particular incident can be somewhat generic in nature and then be tailored to be applied to a specific site. The plan can stipulate alternatives, and consider the allocation of resources necessary to resume service delivery as soon as possible.

The recovery plans should, as for the prime plans, be considered and fully documented, and must be updated at regular intervals, as the resources required to effect the recovery invariably lie with multiple third parties, and there availability and reliability must be questioned regularly. This particularly applies when the company delivering part of the recovery service relies on part of the transportation infrastructure.

Summary

The protection of any Urban Transportation system, or elements of it, can never be guaranteed. Unlike Aviation, where a method of screening of all personnel using the service to known threats, to a high degree of probability is achievable, with Urban transportation the sheer volume of public who use daily the system, in even medium sized cities cannot be afforded equivalent protection ass aviation. With future advances in screening technology, and with more considered physical control (where this is possible), the likelihood of total prevention of an attack just by observation and screening is minimal.

Acknowledging this, the key to achieving a reasonable level of risk management is to maximise the use of intelligence and where possible preclude or at least mitigate the impact of an attack, and respond in the most effective manner. Given the diverse roles necessary to achieve a cohesive outcome the need for a synergised response from both the Public and Private sectors is vital. The most effective solutions will only occur when there is considered application of both sectors resources in a harmonious manner. To achieve this, the leadership must originate at the Public (Government) sector, and the lead then embraced with a spirit of co-operation by the Private sector. Together they will contribute to the successful generation of the treatment plans above to underpin the risk management strategies to be adopted.

The application of sound and accepted treatment plans in the successful function of security for Urban Transportation is the vital framework upon which the protection of the system can most effectively achieved.

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