CASE STUDY
ULFA’s ATTACK ON OIL COLLECTION
STATION (OCS)/GAS COLLECTION STATION (GCS) NAGAJN
– A PRELUDE TO OIL INDIA LTD DULIJAN’S SECURITY (MIS) MANAGEMENT

By Colonel (Retd.) N N Bhatia,
Industrial Security Consultant, Noida

1. At about 2140 hrs on 20 June2003, a group (10-12) of armed ULFA militants dressed in the Army combat uniforms intercepted and boarded OIL Duliajan bus carrying 8 shift duty employees about a km away from OCS /GCS Nagajan. They also ordered the employees to shift to the rear seats of the bus and not to make any noise. The bus driver was directed to drive the bus inside the OCS/GCS Nagajan as routinely was hitherto being done. After the evening meals most of the post staff were in relaxing mood. When the bus reached the main gate of the installation, the sentry who could not see the occupants inside the bus due to the blinding effect of the headlights, opened the gate. As soon the bus was inside, the militants on board opened fire resulting in the death of a Head Constable of the CISF on the spot. Another Constable on duty in a morcha near the main gate opened fire in retaliation but after firing a few rounds, he sustained a bullet injury on his right shoulder incapacitating him to fire any further. In the meantime, the militants entered the Post Commander’s room and fired indiscrimately damaging utensils, cupboards and telephone etc. However, when another Constable tried to retaliate fire, he was also shot dead by the militants. In the cross fire, one of the militants had sustained bullet injuries whose dead body was later found about 100 meters away from the installation. The exchange of fire lasted for about 10 minutes after which the militants decamped with one 7.62 mm SLR, one 9 mm carbine and some ammunition from the deceased CISF personnel and managed to escape under the cover of darkness in the nearby jungle. The militants had snapped the only telephone link of the installation with OIL Duliajan prior to hijacking the bus before launching the lightening attack that surprised and stunned the installation. As a routine, the CISF and OIL radio sets were not kept on listening watch and only opened on fixed timings, therefore, no communication with main location at Duliajan could be established. Thus, no security force or any relief or aid could be rushed on the spot. Since the installation’s staff and locals keep aloof from each other that were also frightened, they did not respond to terrorists’ action. During this swift operation, the militants had also fired two Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) on one of the Crude Oil Storage Tanks located about 100 meters away from the main gate causing a hole in it. The tank did not catch fire as mercifully it was empty or else it would have caused a major catastrophe. No outer perimeter patrolling was ever done by the CISF personnel, as it does not form part of their charter of duties.

2. This remote installation located about 30 kms away from Duliajan is surrounded by reserve forest and tea gardens. There are bushes and wild undergrowth along the outer perimeter restricting visibility and providing ideal hiding places for miscreants Its security is looked after by a contingent of a section plus (16) of CISF personnel under the command of an Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI). The security personnel were complacent, demotivated and not trained to operate in an insurgency environment. There is only one narrow poorly maintained unlit road to the installation linking Duliajan on which the OIL vehicles as a routine plies every day at fixed timings to transport shift staff and stores. Though the lighting arrangements in various facilities in the OCS /GCS were adequate but the same along the perimeter wall and the main gate were not satisfactory being on the same phase line. The installation being a small one, functions in daily three 8 hourly shifts with only 7 employees attending to their duties in each shift. Though the incident had demoralised the employees and CISF staff, the normal functioning of the OCS /GCS was resumed on 22 June 2003 after necessary repairs of the oil storage tank damaged due to RPG firing.

3. Security Lacunae

• Though the OCS /GCS is located in a militant infested remote area, the employees’ bus was neither escorted by armed guard nor was there any means of communication amongst the bus, Duliajan and the Nagajan installation. Even a friendly recognition signal system had not been worked out.
• Only a single security guard was manning the main gate of the remote installation during night in highly insurgency prone area.
• All time communication with radio, line, mobiles or pagers with CISF and OIL Duliajan and the vehicle(s) plying to isolated locations was not provided.
• Instead of the shift employees getting down from the bus at the main gate for the security checking / frisking, the bus was allowed to enter inside the OCS / GCS premises.
• The bus entered the installation with the headlights on, thus blinding and making ineffective the lone sentry at the main gate.
• Lighting arrangements along the perimeter wall / gate were not adequate.
• There were no emergency drills or QRT to handle such emergent situation.
• No SOPs or Standing Orders existed in the CISF Post to avoid such challenging situations.
• OIL has no intelligence cell and no effort was made to gather real time actionable intelligence from available sources.
• Bushes around the outer perimeter restrict visibility and provide ideal camouflaging to miscreants.
• All security and staff personnel were complacent, demotivated, reactive and untrained to operate in insurgency environment.
• OIl’s remote locations are isolated and insulated from the surrounding villages / tea gardens and aloofness is maintained. Mutual aid in emergencies is therefore lacking.
• No perimeter patrolling was ever done and no one was familiar with the surroundings.

4. Lessons Learnt

• All vehicles including shift buses plying at night should be provided with armed escorts and dependable means of communications and isolated movement of vehicle to remote locations should be avoided.
• Routine fixed move timings should be always avoided. All vehicles and patrols should have different time outs and time ins. Similarly route outs and route ins should be staggered to achieve surprise over the militants.
• Passwords or reliable recognition signals should be used for authentication.
• Sentries in night should always be deployed in pairs with overlapping timings.
• During night employees should disembark from the vehicles outside the main gate for a thorough checking / frisking by the security staff before entering the installations and in no case buses and other vehicles be allowed to enter sensitive installations without checking. For this purpose, if required a wicket gate should be provided by the side of the main gate. Vehicle headlights need to be dimmed while entering the installation so that sentries are not blinded.
• Personal weapons should be secured with steel chains tied with belts of the sentries so that at least weapons are not snatched away by the militants.
• Reliable means of communication must be provided between remote posts / installations. Incase line communication is snapped, radio sets should automatically be switched on. The management should provide mobile phones and pagers on need basis for effective and reliable communication.
• Wild growth and bushes outside along the perimeter wall must be pruned regularly up to 30 meters along the outer perimeter wall for clear visibility ensuring miscreants cannot hide in the vicinity.
• Regular day and night patrolling both in clockwise and anti clock wise directions along the perimeter wall need to be done at staggered timings to ensure terrorists do not achieve surprise.
• Training of all ranks to operate in insurgency environment need to be reinforced. Welfare and motivation of personnel and staff at remote locations need to be looked after.
• Need to know and need to go’ principle must be followed to ensure secrecy of movement of personnel and vehicles to remote locations.
• Inside premises lighting and that of outer perimeter wall should be on separate phases. In such emergent situations it may be desirable to switch off inside lights. Intensity of light outside the perimeter should also be more to blind miscreants in taking pop shots in hours of darkness.
• OIL management should undertake meaningful civic actions themes by adopting surrounding villages by providing them basic medical aid, running primary schools and providing lift in transport if spare capacity is available.

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