1.
Introduction
In 1996 I gave a paper at the Third Asia Pacific
Aviation Security Conference in Singapore.
The subject of that paper was Airport Building
Security, and the thrust of the document addressed the planning and design
of the Airport buildings themselves rather than the issues of management and
technology.
Within that paper I commented, after discussing the
various security tools available to secure an Airport building.
“All of these measures, however, will provide
little protection in the case of a suicide attack. The suicide attack adds a further dilemma into Airport/Airline
security which I believe has yet to impact upon the aviation world”.
The impact of 9/11/2001 on the Aviation industry is
still being felt, and even under the current known program will continue to be
felt across the aviation world until at least 2006.
In the last 20 years, aviation to the general public
of all persuasions and economic caliber has become an every day component of
the lives we lead.
Indeed the aviation industry is one of the economics
forces that employs extremely large number of people across the world, either
directly or indirectly, and therefore provides in real terms a direct component
of their and their countries economic well being.
In addition with the service that aviation provides to
the world (global) community, Aviation is fundamental to the successful
exchange of goods and services across the world. This industry enables countries, regardless of their economic
statue to be able to purchase, sell and distribute goods so vital to the
economic well being.
Airlines and airports provide and perform a pivotal
role in the commerce of world today.
However as the prominence of the Aviation industry
grows, and it globally becomes an evermore important tool in international
commerce so I believe will it, be used as a target. As security professionals we are confronted with ever increasing
levels of threat, linked with higher levels of consequence of both aircraft and
airports being targets for both terrorists and criminals alike.
Our challenge as security professionals is to assist
our clients in providing appropriate levels of risk management within airports
and airline infrastructure to ensure that the risks posed by the threats
assessed are both deemed acceptable and manageable.
This paper specifically addresses some of the major
issues that need be considered in Security Airport design, they include
development of a philosophy, the value achieved by security technology,
regulatory considerations, and how that security technology when appropriately
designed, integrated, installed and maintained can provide an enormous return
on the investment made.
2. Philosophy
of Security
PRIME COMPONENTS OF
SECURITY DESIGN
The following is a
philosophy that I believe should underpin how one might cast the elements that
are required to facilitate sound security in any facility. This philosophy is even more important today
then when we first developed it. This
holistic approach is also as important for Airport security design as for less
secure facilities.
As those who would
perpetrate acts using Airports as a tool in their actions or even a target of
their actions are becoming far more sophisticated in their methods, and have
much higher levels of training than was apparent even a decade ago. The approach taken in achieving appropriate
levels of security must encompass all elements.
The philosophy is cast in
three finite components that are intrinsically related.
These components
are:
Ø Management
The management
component relates to the managerial philosophy that is adopted to operate the
airport. This specifically relates to
the security management and what philosophies and processes are to be
utilised. All of this must be
comprehensively documented so that all who perform any element of the security
task are unequivocally clear as to what is to be done, how it is to done and a
methodology of recording what has been done to the standards required.
Ø Planning
and Design
The planning and
design relates to the physical elements, it must take into account a multitude
of facets related to how the airport shall be operated and managed relative to
the functions the airport performs.
This stems from
the selection of site (where possible) through to the complete planning,
physical design, documentation and detailing of the airport. Including the
physical security, locking systems and hardware, hinge systems, windows,
barriers, etc. including the use of ballistics resistant, assault resistant
materials etc as may be required.
There is no
doubt that this element is initially the most important of the tripartite, of
an Airport design. For if the most appropriate planning is not achieved, this
deficiency will place far greater relevance on the other two elements, with
consequential economic and operational impact.
Ø Security
Technology
The final
component of the tripartite is security technology. This item relates specifically to the types of equipment and systems
technology that are to be utilised within the project, proved as an aid to
security management. In a current
International world class Airport, the security technology plays a far greater
role in achieving the appropriate levels of security than in other high
security facilities.
Any imbalance in the
tripartite arrangement of Management, Planning and Design and Technology must
be offset by an increase (or decrease) in the others to provide a workable
solution that satisfies the levels of risk that apply.
3.
Compatibility of Design elements
Security is only as good as the weakest link in the
chain.
This is an old adage and is as valid today as the
person (unknown) who made the observation.
Regardless of whether the project is an International
Airport, Domestic Residence, High Security Prison, Gold Refinery the same
philosophy applies.
Those of the criminal persuasion from petty criminals
to international terrorist are always looking for the weakest link, and there
are innumerable cases through out the world where huge failures of a security,
many with devastating effects have occurred because those elements have found
the weakest link.
Therefore in terms of security it is absolutely vital
that there is a compatibility of all design elements.
This means that the security consultant must be able
to liaise and discuss and converse with the Architects, service engineers and
other engineers of all disciplines, the client and the clients guard force
whether they are in-house or contract, to ensure that the consultants planning
for security takes into account and covers all issues and associated
details.
3.1
Macro Considerations
The macro design considerations far an international
airport extend from the perimeter roads through to the airport boundaries, and
then into all access ways providing entry into the secured areas of the
facility.
The macro consideration cover all aspects of the
facility planning, and the barriers that are provided to manage unwanted access
of any kind into secure areas of whatever category.
The treatment that occurs at one access point into a
facility be it for vehicles, trucks etc should be no different in philosophical
terms and indeed security terms from any other access point.
The philosophies
applied, the level of physical attributes of the barriers incorporated and the
management and technology of all access ways must always be equivalent.
3.2
Micro considerations
The same applies in Micro terms. As with the Macro
considerations, although the level of planning and design will be scaled from
global master planning, to building planning, it involves ensuring separation
from all of the various levels of security, and managing people access rather
than vehicles, trucks etc.
Micro design in some respects is even more complex
than Macro design for once the philosophies are established in Macro terms they
are generally easily dealt with.
In Micro terms however the considerations extends from
the design and planning of the building through all physical elements from
glazing walls ceilings, down to hardware locking systems windows hinges etc.
All of the elements that occur on rings of security
between various security levels must be compatible and provide no weak link.
The same of course applies to the level of technology
that is used and how that technology is applied. Whatever technologies will deliver certain outcomes in one ring
of security must apply to all apertures in that ring.
Compatibly of design elements is fundamental in
underpinning cohesive and inherent security.
4.
flexibility
Flexibility has become the catchcry of the Airport design industry since
9/11. In fact it has been a
consideration since the beginning of the 90s however there has been a
complacency of nations who considered themselves remote from any major threat
that apply to civil aviation and as such did not take the concept of provision
for flexibility seriously.
From now on however any airport that does not consider an appropriate
level of flexibility being incorporated in their security designs does so at
their peril.
This flexibility
should not only countenance altered and increased security threats, it must
consider managing a major crisis, or the impact of a major crisis and ensuring
service delivery can continue, albeit in a reduced capacity.
The rapid change
in technology to meet the altered and ever increasing threat has meant
designers must be current in their thinking.
Indeed constant and continuous research must be undertaken to ensure
that what is included in any project is the latest available at the time of
installation, not the time of design.
Airport projects
have a gestation period of many years.
What is available at the commencement of construction, let alone design
will almost certainly will be superseded by the time of installation of
technology is required.
It is not only the equipment that needs consideration; it is the
infrastructure that is required to support it.
This particularly applies to spatial requirements, communication
methodologies, and power systems.
5.
regulatory control
In considering the level of security that is applied to a modern
Airport, not only is this issue covered by the level of threat determined by
the risk analysis, there are international and in some instances regional
contractual obligations. The following
are the prime organisations that can exert regulatory control over the design
of the security.
5.1
ICAO
The International Civil Aviation Organisation is one of the prime
players in determining the necessary security arrangements for any
International Airport.
They do this through a document called Annexure 17 originally formulated
in 1963; this document however has undergone many variations and additions
since that time. Annexure 17 (latest
edition) including all subsequent amendments, and embracing those currently under
consideration, would be the basis of any risk management strategy used to
underpin the security of an airport.
Annexure 17 has been agreed to by the current 169 contracting States,
and is acceptable to most of those.
This document however as a stand-alone entity will not necessarily
deliver the outcomes the relative Contracting State wishes to achieve.
Annexure 17 defines a set of standards that are considered mandatory and
to which all states contracted to ICAO must comply. In addition it defines a further set of practices, which are
recommended. Collectively these
standards and practices are considered that which is required by the ICAO to
achieve the derived outcomes.
Most states adopt the document in its entirety, however the document is
simple in its language, and is deliberately so. For a number of reasons it is not prescriptive in a pedantic
sense, and is therefore open to interpretation.
The critical issue with Annexure 17 is to ensure that the desired out
comes are actually achieved on all fronts, and that this is achieved in a
manner that it still ensures there is flexibility in the Design. Annexure 17 has changed many times since its
inception at the Tokyo Convention in 1963, usually as a different type of
threat materialised. Almost every
change required States to upgrade to adequately manage this new or increased
level of threat.
Any Airport security design must address and satisfy the outcomes of
Annexure 17, however it MUST allow future upgrading to occur without major
upheaval of the airport in the future.
5.2
IATA
The international Air Transport Association is the trade association of
the Worlds International Airlines. This
group has developed a set of Standards, which are Know as the "8
points" which they recommend be implemented at all international Airports.
Indeed it is arguable that it should apply at all airports.
Whilst these 8 Points are also non-prescriptive, and are focussed on out
comes, they are open to interpretation as what should be delivered. There are a number on instances throughout
the World where individual Airlines choose to layer additional security to that
provided by the contracting State. This
is often because in the eyes of the Airline that the contracting state responsible
for security at the Airport in question, do not have the level of security
provided to meet these IATA standards.
This can cause problems due to either the inferences that might be drawn
by passengers who use the airport, or there is inadequate infrastructure and/or
space available to facilitate the additional equipment required satisfy the
airlines needs.
It is preferable that the level of security provided in any airport will
satisfy the needs of IATA.
5.3
ECAC
The ECAC is the European Civil Aviation Conference. This is a regional group of ICAO states in
the European region. This group have
been in many instances at the forefront of the developing procedures to meet
the increasing and changing threats that are, and will continue to be posed to
Civil Aviation.
This group because they are smaller are able to react to these changes,
and therefore implement controls well ahead of ICAO. The implications of this is that a State that wishes to have a
level of Security that will satisfy the members of the this conference and
ensure that the airlines that fly between that states airport and these
European Airports must seriously consider adopting and implementing ECAC
Document 30.
The Total Document 30 is the manual of Recommendations and Resolutions
relative to security agreed by the ECAC.
FAA (TSA)
The FAA and now the TSA is not a recognised international organisation,
it is a National Authority that is to satisfy the needs of Civil Aviation in
the USA. The FAA provides an invaluable
service to International Aviation particularly with their statistics that they
provide, and make freely available statistics on all incidents that involve
"unlawful interference" in any Aviation Activities or Airlines.
They also play a pivotal role in ensuring that any contracting state who
wishes to be a base that will have USA National flag carriers operate through
that base, or be a carrier that will have direct access from the base in
questions into USA Airports will need to satisfy the FAA (TSA) requirements.
The FAA (TSA) will be the authority that will satisfy for the US
Government that the level of security provided in those airports will
appropriately limit the risk that is posed to the mainland USA.
The US State Departments travel warning on Countries is dependent on
what advice it gets from the FAA. Therefore
if the FAA does not approve a particular Airports Level of Security, it is
unlikely that a favourable travel notice would be issued.
5.4
Regional issues.
Every country has regional issues that have the
ability to impose overarching regulations that are recommended by the above
four prime authorities.
These can be bought about by specific threats that
materialise from issues that are unique to that region. These can include such items as:
4
Specific cultural issues
4
Localised political issues
4
National Issues
The above
summary, which are indicative and certainly not exhaustive have the ability to
impact how a particular country, or airport within that country can impact on
that country or airport to achieve that outcomes in Security it Desires.
In some cases around
the globe, a case in point being the ECAC, these specific regional issues are
identified and dealt with in a manner that ensures that level of threat posed
by them are addressed.
6.
Management
This paper does not extend in any depth into the
management of airport security design.
Moreover it is suffice to say that as with any
facility requiring high levels of security without appropriately considered
management philosophies documentation training of those who will implement it
good security will not materialize.
In an airport the management is even more important
because of the potential risks and consequences involved and it is even more
fundamental to the success of the facility.
For it is management that ensures a high level of the
security by its vigilance in certifying that the security level identified in
the original design philosophies implemented can materialize.
It is also management that overseas and interacts with
the technology, which provides valuable data to the management on which management
can base decisions relative to the level of security health of the facility.
This can extend from managing the general security
risks that apply, to the suitability of staff and passengers to enter secure
zones or even aircraft, as well as ensuring that any baggage that enters the
aircraft is free from threat.
We believe that any international airport in today’s
environment must be under pinned by thoroughly professional management
documentation, which clearly identifies with quality-based procedures all the
functions that must occur, and how they occur.
It also must consider providing accountability for all
of the actions undertaken by the security staff.
Training:
To achieve that proficiency
required by the management of any airport security program, a high level of
training is fundamental.
All staff that operate within the airport must have a
level of training that clearly identifies their responsibilities relative to
security, and how they conduct themselves regarding any issue under their control.
Training must occur at all levels and for all
operators who participate not only in the security process but also in the
functioning of the airport and by implication those airline staff who will work
within in.
The training needs to be at the highest level,
conducted thoroughly and regularly and be underpinned by a quality assurance
program.
The accountability and controls that are implemented
to manage the training process also need to be of the highest level with strict
and accurate record keeping.
7.
Technology
The technology of a modern airport, and particularly
an international airport is one of the most advanced both in quantum and
complexity in any security facility in the world.
Moreover I would suggest that in one of the larger and
more advanced airports, the technology component would constitute systems that
are highest monetary value and the comprise highest level of technological
complexity of any security systems used in the commercial world today.
Technology becomes more that just an aid to security
management in a modern airport.
Indeed without appropriate technology, unless the cost
of manpower was almost negligible, yet still highly reliable it would be
impossible to operate a modern airport and achieve the level of security desired
by any of the regularity authorities involved in aviation in the world today.
I propose to discuss generally the various
technologies that are used.
7.1
Baggage Handling Security (Technology)
Baggage handling technology today has become of one of the most critical
elements in maintaining safety and security on aircraft.
An analysis of the incidents that have occurred where aircraft have been
substantially damaged or even destroyed, either in the air or on the ground
have occurred with the devices that have been secreted in passenger baggage.
A number of these, the classic being the Lockerbie by disaster was where
the bag was secreted into put into the aircraft without the passengers who
checked the bag actually flying.
Given the quantum of bags that are loaded daily onto passenger aircraft
around the world, even assuming that the quality of screening, the chance of a
bag containing a device passing through screening at a airport and getting onto
an aircraft is still possible.
The procedures and screening process recommended by the various
authorities certainly reduce the risks, however the sheer number of bags being
loaded and transferred at Airports world wide on a daily basis increases the
level of risk that one will slip through.
Therefore is it a fundamental component of aircraft safety that checked
baggage is all screened to the highest level that is possibly achievable.
There are number of factors of course that need to be considered in what
is even achievable in today’s environment this being.
The Human element.
As noted in the comments on management, the human element is of
paramount importance; in screening of baggage the process to reach the most
reliable outcome relies on the reaction of the screening staff. They must be well trained, diligent and thorough.
The traditional method involves trained operators who can, utilising
current X-ray technology detect even the most well disguised item, and then
send it for searching. However to
achieve the level of reliability that is now demanded requires a large number
of personnel to carryout the searching to meet the throughput required of wide
bodied aircraft.
At very large terminals with gates in the tens, this becomes difficult
to meet time schedules, and places pressure on the operators to make quick decisions.
As a result at large international airports the current most
satisfactory methodology for baggage screening to date is one where there is
staged screening involving both sophisticated machinery incorporating computers
that do the prime analyses, with suspect articles being sent to skilled
operators for further analyses.
The combination of these stages being processed from stage 1 to stage 6
screening using EDS ing equipment and CT machines delivering the highest level
of reliability.
The stage process varies from authority to authority and example of
which is:
Stage 1 – Automatic screening using EDS
technology. Cleared bags
continue
Stage 2 –
Suspect bags have their images further examined by a skilled operator. Cleared
bags continue, suspect bags are sent to a CT machine.
Stage 3 – Automatic screening of occurs by the CT machine.
Stage 4 –
Suspect bags have their images further examined by a skilled operator. Cleared bags continue, suspect bags are sent
to passenger reconciliation room.
Stage 5 – Passenger reconciliation occurs manually with the
passenger. With trace vapour detection,
hard and soft copy images of EDS and CT scans. Cleared bags continue
Stage 6 – Suspect bags are destroyed.
This process must be integrated into the baggage handling machinery, and
the baggage screening machines must be designed into the system.
The system however still relies on the skill of the operators that
actually do the screening once the machine is determined the bag is being
suspect. These staff have to be able to
screen the bag in a relatively short period of time and determine whether the
threat is real or suspect.
All of the above process must be undertaken in a manner that does not
inhibit the flow process. All of the
above have the ability to impact significantly on the level of screening that
occurs to checked baggage.
Equipment available
Secondly the machines employed must be able to detect the type of threat
that is expected. In most cases this is
consists relatively small amounts of plastic explosive, or explosive slurry,
and the associated triggering devices or mechanisms. The equipment utilises sophisticated software that analyses the
images derived from the machines and
presents scenarios to the operator to make a decision. The software has the
ability to make decisions on its own, and decide what is suspect or not.
This equipment must be fully networked into a cohesive system that can
be overviewed and supervised remotely.
The network must be capable of Threat Image Projection and digital recording
for future training purposes.
These machines are sophisticated, and require highly skilled and
technical maintenance. These machines
must not only be able to detect when initially installed, but must be able to
perform at the level required of them for the life of the machine. There must
be a high level of both programmed and breakdown maintenance.
This
particularly applies to the current generations of CT machines which using
rotating machinery require extremely high levels of maintenance. The implementation
of CT machines into a baggage screening process invariably require redundancy
incorporated in the design, even in some instances of up to 100% capacity built
into the system to sustain the appropriate screening and as well maintain
baggage flows of the required level.
The economics of what is achievable.
Finally as with any element there is an economic consideration of the
costs of screening checked baggage. The
economic component is that the contracting state must be able to afford to
implement the technology, and to maintain the technology.
There have been arguments that it should be based on the user pays
principle. This may be a valid
consideration. With the quantum of
passenger traffic that is occurring today and with it continuing to increase it
would appear that the capital and operating costs of these machines could be
recouped from passengers. In a number
of countries, and particularly since 9/11 security control cost penalties have
applied.
The scenario of the alternative and the implications of a known incident
materialising from a port that was identified as occurring because of
inappropriate measures could do enormous damage to the authority and then the
country concerned.
7.2
Passenger Screening Systems
The perceived
threat from passengers themselves took a quantum leap at 9/11. In fact this threat had always been there,
there was however a level of complacency, especially in some quarters in the
United States, although it occurred else where, was primarily driven by
convenience for passengers in some instances, and cultural issues in
others. This has now changed. The issue of suicide has heightened the need
for comprehensive screening that can deliver an extremely high level of
certainty.
The equipment
being used currently has not necessesary altered, however the way it is
utilised and the strict adherence to procedures and criteria that were
previously, in some regions lax, has changed.
There is still
concern as to the introduction of explosive material that can be detonated on
aircraft, again because of the suicide factor.
Currently used technology combinations of hand baggage s and hand held
and walkthrough Magnetometers provides no guarantee detection of enough
material being taken into the sterile area to create an IED with enough
material to bring down the Aircraft.
Technologies are
available, as are Dogs who will overcome this issue, however these are not
widely used as yet. It may take another
incident to trigger their introduction.
7.3
Security management and Control Technologies
The base systems that manage the security
of the terminal and concourse facilities are the Security managements system,
which is integrated with the CCTV systems.
The SMS usually performs or manages the following functions.
4
Access control and card management
4
Intruder alarm control and management
4
Static duress (silent alarms) alarms
4
Mobile duress alarms
4
Photo Identification systems
4
Perimeter systems
4
Passenger boarding systems
These systems also interface with the following technologies;
4
CCTV systems
4
Telephone and data systems
4
Public address and Voice evacuation
systems
